Historical and Legal Analysis of Economic Sanctions
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.22394/2686-7834-2024-2-103-111Keywords:
sanctions, unilateral coercive measures, embargo, boycott, economic blockade, Rule of 1756, Art. 16 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, economic potential of sanctionsAbstract
The article analyzes the history of the formation of the concept of coercive economic measures (economic sanctions) in the legal aspects. The work presents the author’s periodization of the development of the concept of economic restrictions, taking into account the nature of the economic measures applied by the initiating state in a specific period of history and the degree of their effectiveness. It is concluded that the First World War has become the key catalyst for the development of the concept of economic pressure on unfriendly powers, which was legally enshrined in Art. 16 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. Subsequently, the evolution of the system of collective security fundamentally changed the role of economic sanctions. The author considers the problematics of legality and effectiveness of economic sanctions in different historical periods, provides modern examples of sanctions and assess their efficiency. The author concluded that sanctions revealed their economic potential in each new period and eventually became the primary means to compliance with international law.Downloads
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